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Abstract: Since 9/11, the United States has waged a new brand of
financial war against rogue regimes, terrorist groups, and criminal
syndicates. By leveraging American global economic predominance,
the US has isolated such actors from the financial system. The
domain of financial warfare, however, is now no longer the sole
province of the US and presents challenges from enemies and
competitors.1

O

n 8 October 2012, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
publicly bemoaned that the Iranian economy was under direct
economic assault, with oil sales cut, bank transfers banned, and
the value of the Iranian rial and foreign currency reserves plummeting.
He admitted plainly, “The enemy has mobilized all its forces to enforce its
decision, and so a hidden war is underway, on a very far-reaching global
scale. . . . [W]e should realize that this is a kind of war through which the
enemy assumes it can defeat the Iranian nation.”2 He was right. Over the
past decade, the United States waged a new brand of financial warfare,
unprecedented in its reach and effectiveness. This “hidden war” has often
been underestimated or misunderstood, but it is no longer secret and has
since become central to America’s national security doctrine.
In a series of economic pressure campaigns, the United States
financially squeezed and isolated America’s principal enemies of this
period—al Qaeda, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Far from relying
solely on the classic sanctions or trade embargoes of old, these campaigns have consisted of a novel set of financial strategies that harness
the international financial and commercial systems to ostracize rogue
actors and constrict their funding flows, inflicting real pain.
America’s enemies have realized they have been hit with a new breed
of financial power. And they have felt the painful effects. Al Qaeda has
found it harder, costlier, and riskier to raise and move money around
the world and has had to adapt to find new ways to raise capital for its
movement. The documents found in Osama bin Laden’s compound in
Abbottabad, Pakistan, reflect a terrorist leader and movement in search
of new sources of money. This development was not new—from 9/11
on, the movement struggled to maintain its core financing. In statement
after statement—intended for donors and sometimes only for internal
consumption—al Qaeda admitted that it has been choked financially.
In a 9 July 2005 letter to Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, leader of al Qaeda in
Iraq, Ayman al-Zawahiri, then al Qaeda’s number two, asked for money,
noting that “many of the lines [of financial assistance] have been cut off.”3
1     This article is adapted from Juan C. Zarate's Treasury’s War: The Unleashing of a New Era of
Financial Warfare (New York: PublicAffairs Books, 2013).
2     “Ahmadinejad: Hidden War on Global Scale Waged Against Iran’s Oil Sector,” Iran Daily Brief,
October 8, 2012.
3     Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, July 9, 2005, Federation of American Scientists,
Intelligence Resource Program, http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2005/10/letter_in_english.pdf.
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The campaign against North Korea had a direct and immediate
impact. In the wake of financial pressure unlike any the regime had
seen while under international sanctions, North Korea found its bank
accounts and illicit financial activity in jeopardy. A North Korean deputy
negotiator at the time quietly admitted to a senior White House official,
“You finally found a way to hurt us.”4
The Iranians, too, have suffered the economic effects of a targeted
financial assault. On 14 September 2010, former Iranian president Akbar
Hashemi Rafsanjani urged the Iranian Assembly of Experts to take
seriously the painful sanctions and financial pressures imposed by the
United States and the international community. “Throughout the revolution,” he said, “we never had so many sanctions [imposed on Iran] and I
am calling on you and all officials to take the sanctions seriously.”5 The
journalist Moisés Naím opined that the financial pressures on Iran “are
biting, the sanctions are very, very powerful. They are the most sophisticated economic and financial sanctions imposed on a country ever.”6
All of these assaults derive from a blueprint for financial warfare
developed years ago by the United States. It is defined by the use of
financial tools, pressure, and market forces to leverage the banking
sector, private-sector interests, and foreign partners to isolate rogue
actors from the international financial and commercial systems and
eliminate their funding sources. We successfully formulated and used
these strategies during the administration of President George W. Bush,
and since the changing of administrations, President Barack Obama and
his team continued to rely heavily on this brand of financial warfare.
The world faces challenges from rogue states, networks, and actors, but
there now exists a well-developed international system to use financial
information, power, and suasion to isolate rogues financially. This type
of warfare cannot solve all national security issues. However, this private
sector-based paradigm gives the United States and its allies the tools and
leverage to affect rogue actors and their interests in ways that historically
would have been out of reach.
Money creates vulnerabilities. The need for money to survive and
operate in the twenty-first century—whether in local economies or
globally—creates financial trails that do not lie and dependencies that
are hard to hide. In a globalized economy, money flows across borders
at a lightning pace and in staggering volumes. With the ease of a phone
call or the touch of an app, billions of dollars move every day in myriad
ways—via antiseptic wire transfers, the traditional practice of hawala,
and satchels full of cash. Money is the common denominator that connects disparate groups and interests—often generating new networks of
convenience aligned against the United States. Cutting off funding flows
to rogue groups or states restricts their ability to operate and forces them
to make choices—not only budget decisions, but also strategic choices.
One suicide bombing may cost a terrorist organization less than $1,000,
4     Juan Carlos Zarate, “Prologue,” in Treasury’s War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial
Warfare (New York: PublicAffairs, 2013).
5     Thomas Erdbrink, “Cleric Calls on Iran to Take U.S.-Led Sanctions Seriously,” The Washington
Post, September 14, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/14/
AR2010091403790.html.
6     “Friday News Roundup,” The Diane Rehm Show, National Public Radio, October 5, 2012,
http://thedianerehmshow.org/audio-player?nid=16725.
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but if that organization cannot pay for all the sophisticated training it
would like, cannot adequately maintain its international alliances, and
cannot develop all the programs and operations it imagines, then its
ultimate impact will be limited.
After September 11, 2001, the United States unleashed a counterterrorist financing campaign that reshaped the very nature of financial
warfare. There were three primary themes defining this campaign that
shaped the environment and evolution of financial power after 9/11: the
expansion of the international anti-money laundering regime; the development of financial tools and intelligence geared specifically to dealing
with issues of broad national security; and the growth of strategies based
on a new understanding of the centrality of both the international financial system and the private sector to transnational threats and issues
pertaining to national security. This environment reshaped the ways in
which key actors—namely, the banks—operated in the post-9/11 world.
In this context, governments implemented and expanded global
anti-money-laundering regulations and practices based on principles
of financial transparency, information sharing, and due diligence.
They applied new reporting and information-sharing principles to new
sectors of the domestic and international financial community, such as
insurance companies, brokers and dealers in precious metals and stones,
money-service businesses, and hawaladars (hawala is a trust-based money
transfer mechanism).
This approach worked by focusing squarely on the behavior of
financial institutions rather than on the classic sanctions framework of
the past. In this new approach, the policy decisions of governments
are not nearly as persuasive as the risk-based compliance calculus of
financial institutions. For banks, wire services, and insurance companies, there are no benefits to facilitating illicit transactions that could
bring high regulatory and reputational costs if uncovered. The risk
is simply too high. It is the illicit or suspicious behavior of the actors
themselves as they try to access the international financial system that
triggers their isolation. Such an approach was possible because of the
unique international environment after 9/11. Interestingly, under the
right conditions, this model created a “virtuous” cycle of self-isolation
by suspect financial actors. The more isolated the rogue actors became,
the more likely they were to engage in even more evasive and suspicious financial activities to avoid scrutiny, and the more they found
themselves excluded from financial networks. The actions of legitimate
international financial community participants are based on their own
business interests, and when governments appear to be isolating rogue
financial actors, the banks will fall into line. Reputation and perceived
institutional integrity became prized commodities in the private sector’s
calculus after 9/11.
These tools and this approach are no longer new. Economic sanctions and financial influence are now the national security tools of choice
when neither diplomacy nor military force proves effective or possible.
This tool of statecraft has become extremely important in coercing and
constraining the behavior of nonstate networks and recalcitrant, rogue
regimes, which often appear beyond the reach of classic government
power or influence. But rogue actors are already adapting to this kind of
financial pressure. It is only a matter of time until US competitors use
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the lessons of the past decade to wage financial battles of their own—
especially against the United States. More worrisome, America’s ability
to use these powers could diminish as the economic landscape changes.
Financial warfare ultimately stems from the ability of the United States
to use its financial powers with global effect. This ability, in turn, derives
from the centrality and stability of New York as a global financial center,
the importance of the dollar as a reserve currency, and the demonstration effects of any steps, regulatory or otherwise, taken by the United
States in the broader international system. If the US economy loses its
predominance, or the dollar sufficiently weakens, our ability to wage
financial warfare could wane. It is vital that policymakers and ordinary
Americans understand what is at stake and how this new brand of financial warfare evolved.

Challenges to US Financial Power

The current economic environment involves three significant trends
that undercut America’s use of its financial power. The use of new currencies and technologies outside the formal financial system, through
the Internet, and with less and less accountability and transparency,
undercut the ability to track money flows with traditional means. At the
same time, rogue actors are coalescing around a common goal of circumventing and undermining US financial pressure and using financial
weapons themselves. Finally, the US dollar—and its predominance—is
a target for competitors and those who bemoan the world’s reliance on
the dollar as the accepted reserve and trading currency as the central
element of US financial power.
All of this is happening as the complexity of the global financial
system increases, with more financial products and ways of investing
and moving money that make tracking and controlling legitimate financial activity increasingly difficult. The current environment—aided by
the cloak of anonymity provided by the Internet and the complexity of
a global financial system—allows nefarious actors to collude in their
activities—quietly and surreptitiously. Iran, for example, is known to
use terrorist and militia proxies, such as Hezbollah and Shia militias in
Iraq, to extend its influence. Russian intelligence is understood to have
close ties to Russian and Eurasian organized crime. China is alleged to
use legions of college-aged students as hackers to help drive the cyberespionage attacking Western, Asian, and Indian systems.7 The increasing
convergence of financial interests between criminal networks and certain
nation-states represents an alliance of financial rogues that threatens the
international system. States are able to leverage the resources and reach
of networked organizations while claiming an arm’s-length distance
from their nefarious activities. If coordinated, those alliances could
target the economic vulnerabilities of the United States.
These actors have new digital tools at their disposal to elude the
reach of anti-money-laundering and counterterrorist financing efforts.
For example, bitcoin (BTC) is a digital currency transferred through
peer-to-peer networks on the Internet. The software, an early implementation of the idea of “crypto-currency,” uses cryptography rather
7     Max Fisher, “Someone Found a College Recruitment Notice to Join China’s Alleged
Military Hacker Team,” The Washington Post, February 20, 2013.

Conflict by Other Means

Zarate

91

than central authorities to issue and transfer money. The result is that
transactions are cheap, accounts cannot be frozen (unless users keep
bitcoins in a separate third-party online wallet service), and there are
no prerequisites or arbitrary limits for use. Payments are anonymous,
identified only by users’ various chosen bitmap addresses. Transactions
are irreversible and can be received at any time, even if the user’s computer is off. Bitcoin uses opensource software, so anybody can examine
the codes of transactions and use the crypto-keys to ensure that no one
pays for multiple transactions with the same money. An April 2012
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) report evaluating bitcoin use and
exchange rates (currently about $15 for one bitcoin) identified bitcoins
as an increasingly attractive option for cybercriminals and other illicit
groups. The report concluded that criminals will increasingly exploit
bitcoins, using malware to steal the digital currency, as well as botnets to
generate new currency without preexisting value. The potential for illicit
use of bitcoins will only increase as the currency grows in popularity and
the exchange rate stabilizes.8
Other nontraditional currencies offer criminals and terrorist groups
similar opportunities for theft and anonymous movement of money.
“Linden” dollars are the virtual currency for the world of Second Life,
a digital alternate reality, the first virtual currency to float. They are
traded on the LindeX exchange, which is run by the Linden Lab, the
creators of Second Life, and can be exchanged for real-world currency.
By 2010, user transactions on the LindeX exchange topped $567 million
in Linden dollars and users cashed Linden dollars into $55 million in
US dollars.9
“Ven” is the digital currency of the social networking community
Hub Culture, which operates by invite and includes physical “pavilions”
where members meet and collaborate. Members from different countries can exchange a wide array of goods and services in ven at a single
global price within the pavilion communities as well as online. Although
in 2007 the ven was originally given a fixed exchange rate (10 ven to
the dollar), it is now a floating currency and was recently tied to carbon
futures, making it one of the world’s first “green” currencies.10
Bartering has also become a more active way of circumventing the
classic financial systems used in local or international trade. Barter
exchanges facilitate trades between parties by assigning members
“trading credits” equal to the values of goods and services. These credits
function similarly to money. Members can exchange goods for credits and
use the credits in future transactions. ITEX, the country’s largest barter
network, which is based in Seattle and boasts more than 24,000 members,
charges both a subscription fee ($20 per month) and a transaction fee
(6 percent for online trades, 7.5 percent for in-person transactions). Its
trading credits are called “ITEX dollars.”11 The country’s five hundred
bartering exchanges have become enormously popular in the wake of
8     US Federal Bureau of Investigation, Bitcoin Virtual Currency: Unique Features Present Distinct
Challenges for Deterring Illicit Activity, April 24, 2012, http://cryptome.org/2012/05/fbi-bitcoin.pdf.
9     T. Linden, 2009 End of Year Second Life Economy Wrap Up (including Q4 Economy in Detail), January
19, 2010.
10     Eric Savitz, “Currency: Dollars Aren’t Enough; Here Comes The Ven (Video),” Forbes,
November 11, 2011.
11     “ITEX - Glossary of Terms,” accessed December 11, 2013, http://www.itex.com/help/
glossary.asp
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the financial crisis, which both limited access to cash and eroded trust in
banks for many people. The International Reciprocal Trade Association
estimates the annual US bartering market at around $12 billion.12 Many
participants prefer bartering because it encourages local purchases, links
businesses with customers they would not otherwise have found, and
increases their ability to sell surplus goods or services.
Many communities now use local currencies and Local Exchange
Trading Systems (LETS), community-specific systems based on mutual
credit. A Community Exchange System (CES) offers a global alternative
to LETS, setting up a much larger currency and trading marketplace
that operates in a similar fashion.

Directed Threats and Alliances of Financial Rogues
Nonstate actors have been quick to recognize the coming age of economic and financial warfare. The documents found in Osama bin Laden’s
Abbottabad compound spoke of a strategic strike at the economy of the
United States by hitting oil tankers and critical energy infrastructure.
Indeed, al Qaeda and its associated movements have increasingly focused
their rhetoric and strategy on bleeding and bankrupting America.13 Part
of this strategy involves killing the United States with a thousand cuts
by baiting US overreaction and overspending. Al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) has labeled this “Operation Hemorrhage.”
Another part of this strategy involves hitting key targets and vulnerabilities at a time when the US and global economy is weakened, so as
to prolong and exacerbate economic malaise. Energy nodes, transportation chokepoints, and ports around the world provide terrorists and
nefarious actors with ample opportunity to shock the interconnected
international commercial system. Al Qaeda attempted to do just this in
2006, with the failed attack on the enormous Saudi oil facility at Abqaiq,
as well as in 2002, with an attack on the French oil tanker MV Limburg
off the coast of Yemen.14
International organized crime syndicates have expanded the moneylaundering operations that helped fuel their growth and global financial
reach, making them more layered and more varied in their use of investment vehicles.15 Such groups not only understand how to profit from the
international system but also recognize that certain types of investments
and influence can shield their activities and leadership from law enforcement and political pressure. Translated into a more aggressive posture,
such groups and potential terrorist allies could see opportunities in controlling certain businesses or wielding influence over particular markets

12     Eric Spitznagel, “Rise of the Barter Economy,” BloombergBusinessWeek: Lifestyle, April 26, 2012,
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-04-26/rise-of-the-barter-economy
13     “Bin Laden: Goal Is to Bankrupt U.S.,” CNN.com, November 1, 2004, http://www.cnn.
com/2004/WORLD/meast/11/01/binladen.tape/
14     2006 attack: Joel Roberts, “Al Qaeda Threatens More Oil Attacks,” News, CBS News,
February 27, 2006, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/al-qaeda-threatens-more-oil-attacks/; 2002 attack: “Yemen Says Tanker Blast Was Terrorism,” BBC, October 16, 2002, sec. Middle East, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2334865.stm.
15     Kristin M. Finklea, “Organized Crime in the United States: Trends and Issues for Congress,”
Congressional Research Service, January 27, 2010.
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and states, distorting the political frameworks in which they operate
through corruption, intimidation, and deepening influence.
As these criminal groups grow more interconnected in ways that
transcend national boundaries, such networks are gaining influence
in strategically vital markets that could impact the accessibility to and
stability of these markets. In addition, the ability of such groups to
provide their infrastructure and expertise to others (including terrorists)—whether through access to fraudulent travel documents or access
to nuclear material—raises the specter of alliances of convenience and
profit aligned dangerously against the United States.16
These unholy alliances already exist in some cases. For example,
drug trade and human trafficking provided most of the finances for the
Mumbai attack.17 The US Treasury continues to identify and designate
entities in certain jurisdictions—such as Belarus—that are providing
weapons and financial facilitation to sanctioned countries—such as Syria.

Attack on the Dollar?
Attendant to this crisis of fiscal legitimacy are increasing challenges
to the primacy of the US dollar. The standing of the dollar allows the
United States to shape the global economic and political system and
offers it greater influence abroad, greater flexibility at home, and greater
insulation from international crises.18 For those who would downplay the
benefits of dollar dominance, the British experience is instructive. Prior
to World War II, the British pound sterling was the primary international
currency, thereby allowing Britain to finance military expenditures and
manage its wartime debt. Once the sterling was eclipsed by the dollar in
the postwar years, Britain was no longer able to finance its war debt, a
problem that contributed to its economic decline and exacerbated persistent financial crises during the 1960s.19
The sustainability of the dollar as the leading global reserve currency has been a near constant concern since the 1960s. During this
time, foreign dollar reserves began to outgrow US gold reserves, and
many international actors began to question the United States’ ability
to convert dollars to gold at the fixed official rate specified by Bretton
Woods. As this confidence declined, speculative attacks against the
dollar abounded. The United States eventually abandoned the gold standard, but the dollar has retained its dominance ever since. Thus, anyone
decrying the dollar’s current strength risks crying wolf.
16     Richard Shultz et al., “The Sources of Instability in the Twenty-First Century,” Strategic Studies
Quarterly, Summer 2011; Douglas Farah, “Terrorist-Criminal Pipelines and Criminalized States:
Emerging Alliances,” Prism 2, no. 3 (2011), www.ndu.edu/press/emerging-alliances.html.
17     US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, “U.S. Vulnerabilities to Money
Laundering, Drugs, and Terrorist Financing: HSBC Case History,” July 17, 2012, http://www.gpo.
gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg76061/html/CHRG-112shrg76061.htm.
18     Benjamin J. Cohen, The Geography of Money (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 128.
19     Hyoung-Kyu Chey, “Theories of International Currencies and the Future of the World
Monetary Order,” International Studies Review 14, no. 1 (2012): 51–77; Barry Eichengreen, Globalizing
Capital: A History of the International Monetary System, 2nd ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1996), 103; Barry Eichengreen, Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar and the Future of
the International Monetary System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 40–42; Jonathan Kirshner,
“Dollar Primacy and American World Power: What’s at Stake?” Review of International Political Economy
15, no. 3 (2008): 418–438.
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Nevertheless, in the wake of the Great Recession, there are convincing signs that we are headed for a restructuring of the international
monetary system as faith in the dollar faltered. The reality is that
countries are now questioning the wisdom of carrying debt obligations
solely in dollars, and they are moving toward baskets of currencies and
alternate trading conventions and currencies to reduce their reliance
on the dollar. The portion of global reserves in dollars declined from
approximately 72 percent in 2000 to 62 percent in 2012 as the rest of the
world attempted to decouple from the US economy.
The Chinese have begun to use their own currency, the renminbi,
and reserves in certain trading situations and with some partners with
more frequency. China recently completed a $1.08 billion currency swap
deal with Kazakhstan and has similar arrangements with Argentina,
Belarus, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, Ireland,
Argentina, and Iceland. China has also reached agreements with Russia
and Brazil to gradually eliminate the dollar from bilateral trade.20 All
five of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, all
of which have large, rapidly growing economies) have taken significant
steps toward trading in their own currencies, diversifying their foreign
exchange reserves, and hedging their bets against the growing instability
of the dollar and the euro.
Prior to the G8 summit of 2009, China, Russia, and India explicitly called for an end to dollar dominance. On January 7, 2011, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) produced a paper outlining a plan
for replacing the dollar with Special Drawing Rights (SDRs)—IMFissued currency defined in terms of the weighted average of the dollar,
euro, yen, and pound. The plan would create a liquid bond market for
SDRs and thereby elevate the IMF to the de facto role of the world
central bank.21
This portends a world of multiple reserve currencies, one in which
the dollar serves as the primary rudder, steering a steady course to
prevent erratic devaluations, but in which the currents are more volatile
than they have been for decades. In this scenario, the euro, the British
pound, the Swiss franc, and the renminbi would play enhanced roles as
regional currencies for Europe and Asia, thereby limiting US influence
in these areas.
A more dangerous scenario is an intensification of what James
Rickards has termed “Currency War III.” According to Rickards, this
war began in 2010 and involved competitive devaluations of the yuan,
dollar, and euro. These concerns were echoed publicly in 2013 by finance
ministries and central banks. It is important to note that the biggest
threat is not that yuan devaluation directly damages the US economy.
The true threat is systemic. The current China-US monetary relationship is unsustainable and brings the fragility of the entire international
monetary system into sharp relief. As Rickards contended, by 2011 both
20     “Brazil-China Bilateral Trade in Real and Yuan Instead of US Dollar,” MercoPress, June 30, 2009,
http://en.mercopress.com/2009/06/29/brazil-china-bilateral-trade-in-real-and-yuan-instead-ofus-dollar; Toni Vorobyova, “Russia, China to Boost Rouble, Yuan Use in Trade,” Reuters, June 17,
2009, www.reuters.com/article/2009/06/17/russia-china-currency-idUSLH72167820090617.
21     Strategy, Policy, and Review Department, Enhancing International Monetary Stability—A Role for
the SDR? (International Monetary Fund, January 7, 2011), http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/
eng/2011/010711.pdf.
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countries were “locked in a trillion-dollar financial embrace, essentially
a monetary powder keg that could be detonated by either side if the currency wars spiraled out of control.”22 Economic historian Niall Ferguson
has dubbed this presently symbiotic yet ultimately dysfunctional relationship “Chimerica.” In order to maintain employment for its massive
population, China must keep its exports attractive to American consumers and keep the yuan tied to the dollar. As such, China must continue
to buy dollar assets and increase its account surpluses. It is caught in
a “dollar trap.” China’s current exchange-rate policy thus ironically
helps to preserve dollar dominance.23 Chimerica is, for Ferguson, highly
unstable. A sudden deterioration in political relations, perhaps stemming
from a clash over natural resources or Taiwan, could trigger a major war
and a corresponding collapse of the international financial system.24
Currently, China is the most competitive player in the so-called currency wars. Yet all major powers are attempting to influence the relative
value of their currencies, a ruthless competition that places the entire
global monetary system at risk. The currency war need not devolve into
actual war for it to prove disastrous. A small but systemically critical
event—such as the collapse of the Spanish bond market—could ignite
a widespread loss of confidence in paper currencies and a massive
transition to hard assets (gold) led by a shrewd and forward-leaning
competitor state such as Russia or China.25
Even if one doubts the likelihood of such a crisis, China is nonetheless taking steps to internationalize the renminbi and thereby enhance
its power relative to the dollar. This is happening in two ways. First,
by purchasing sovereign debt of other Asian countries, China pushes
up the value of these regional currencies and incentivizes its neighbors
to reciprocate by buying Chinese debt in order to devalue their currencies against the yuan. The net result is a greater international role for
the renminbi. Second, the Chinese government is finalizing programs
that would allow select foreign financial institutions to invest their
renminbi deposits in Chinese equity and bond markets. With increased
stakes in renminbi-based businesses, these foreign firms will have more

22     James Rickards, Currency Wars: The Making of the Next Global Crisis (New York: Penguin,
2011), 107.
23     Niall Ferguson, The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World (New York: Penguin,
2008), 336–337. In Ferguson’s view, “Chimerica” was “the underlying cause of the surge in bank
lending, bond issuance and new derivative contracts . . . the underlying cause of the hedge fund
population explosion . . . the underlying reason why private equity partnerships were able to borrow
money left, right, and center to finance leveraged buyouts . . . the underlying reasons why the US
mortgage market was so awash with cash in 2006 that you could get a 100 per cent mortgage with no
income, no job or assets.” Ferguson has further argued that the United States’ loose monetary policy
is its own form of currency manipulation, causing the dollar to depreciate approximately 25 percent
against the currencies of its major trading partners in recent years (9 percent against the renminbi).
24     Ferguson wrote: “One important lesson of history is that major wars can arise even when
economic globalization is very far advanced and the hegemonic position of an English-speaking
empire seems fairly secure.” Ferguson, The Ascent of Money, 339–340.
25     Rickards concluded: “The path of the dollar is unsustainable and therefore the dollar will not
be sustained. In time, the dollar will join a crowd of multiple reserve currencies, be subordinated to
SDRs, be rejuvenated by gold or descend into chaos with both redemptive and terminal possibilities.” Rickards, Currency Wars, 255.
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reasons to promote the renminbi so that they can reap the benefits of
renminbi internationalization.26
Though the dollar remains superior for now and appears to be the
currency of choice amid economic turmoil in Europe, it—along with
American financial preeminence—is coming under direct assault.

Conclusion

In many ways, the United States has taught the world how to use
financial power in the twenty-first century. The United States has deliberately leveraged US capital markets, the centrality of the dollar, and
American ability to set global standards and mores to drive national
security goals. The power of this paradigm is derived from the centrality and stability of New York as a global financial center, the importance
of dollar-clearing transactions, and the demonstration effects of any
regulatory or other steps taken by the United States or major US financial institutions in the broader international system. Our competitors
have learned from our use of power, and our enemies have witnessed
our vulnerabilities.
Countries such as Russia and China will continue to challenge the
dominance of the US-led international system and the dollar itself. If
such attacks succeed, they could weaken the ability of the United States
to affect or move private sector decisionmaking in line with national
security interests, regardless of what other governments do. The advent
of nuclear weapons forced scholars and policymakers to rethink their
models and methods for advancing US national security. In a similar
way, the coming financial wars will force the United States to adapt
amid a new geo-economic order defined by globalization and the speed
and ease of communication and transnational commerce. In the age of
nuclear competition, the United States drew strength from its scientific
and technological advantage; however, it is becoming increasingly clear
that America is losing its competitive edge in the era of economic security. This development is particularly troubling in light of the unique
advantages it possesses as the vanguard of the international trading and
financial system and hub of innovation and collaboration.
The domain of financial warfare will no longer remain the sole
province of American power. A wide array of state and nonstate actors
may step up to wield economic power and influence in the twenty-first
century. Confronting challenges, seizing opportunities, and minimizing systemic vulnerabilities must, therefore, proceed as part of a
coordinated effort. The United States must play a new and distinctly
financial game of geopolitical competition to ensure its security and to
seize emerging opportunities. Just as the mistakes leading to 9/11 were
deemed a failure of imagination, the inability of the US government to
recognize the changed landscape could be considered a collective failure
of comprehension.
26     Chey wrote: “And in fact, a group of prominent international banks, among them HSBC,
Standard Chartered, Citigroup, and JPMorgan[,] have recently been holding international roadshows
to promote use of the renminbi by their corporate customers for trade deals with China, instead of
the dollar. Some of them have moreover offered financial incentives, such as discounted transaction
fees, to firms opting to settle their trades in renminbi.” Chey, “Theories of International Currencies,”
71. See also Robert Cookson, “Banks Back Switch to Renminbi for Trade,” Financial Times, August
26, 2010.
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The financial wars are coming. It is time to redesign a national
economic security model to prepare for them. If we fail to do so, the
United States risks becoming vulnerable and being left behind as other
competitors race toward the future.

